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Non-governmental or “third sector” organizations (NGOs) have grown rapidly in number, size 
and influence in recent decades. This third sector is made up of “not-for-profit organizations 
governed by private law and with independent legal status, pursuing programs of general 
interest for the improvement of society in the fields of social welfare and sustainability: 
community action, education, healthcare, environmental protection, development cooperation 
and sustainable development” (Aenor, 2004, #1).  
NGOs have proven to be excellent, alongside governments and corporate social initiatives, for 
promoting a wide range of causes. In any case, they contribute effectively to achieving 
important social objectives; they have proved to be selfless and effective; and their 
organizational flexibility has enabled them to address new opportunities. As a result, they are 
generally held in high public esteem in both developed and developing countries. 
More recently, however, NGOs have faced a number of serious challenges. The influence of 
globalization, technological progress, rising standards of living in advanced countries and also 
in many emerging countries, etc., on the one hand, have changed the political, social, economic 
and human framework in which NGOs operate. People have become more sensitive to the 
problems (hunger, disease, income inequalities, lack of opportunity, impact of natural and man-
made disasters, etc.). They also realize that many of these problems could be overcome, or at 
least alleviated, by companies (given greater financial resources, information technology, 
communications, technological progress, etc.). And their values have changed (solidarity, 
awareness, volunteering, compassion, etc.). All this has given a new dimension to aiding the 
disadvantaged, which is the basis for both the demand and the supply of NGO services. 
In response, the role, number, scale and function of NGOs have changed. Sometimes NGOs take 
over the role of governments; other times they are subordinate or complementary to 
governments. In some cases they have replaced or become a channel for individual 
                                              
1 This study is part of the work of the “la Caixa” Chair of Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance 
at IESE. I would like to thank Daniel Galland for his help in gathering documentation for this study.  
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philanthropy or charity; in others they obtain funds from government, or even from companies, 
which have themselves become agents of change by becoming involved in the community. The 
size and scope of NGOs has grown. Nowadays, some are multinationals, substituting or 
partnering with international bodies and playing a role as economic and political actors on the 
international stage, where they often set the agenda. The number and variety of areas in which 
NGOs are involved has expanded to include immigration, dependant care, human rights 
advocacy, peace promotion, the fight against specific diseases, or pressure for acts of corporate 
social responsibility (Eisenberg, 2000).  
All this has prompted a thorough reconsideration of the principles that govern NGOs, the way 
they are organized, and how they operate. Precisely because they move significant amounts of 
resources for what sometimes are crucially important human and social projects, they are 
expected to be, not only financially sustainable, but also effective and efficient.
2 As social and 
political actors, they must adhere to the rules of ethics and honesty, and show commitment to 
protecting the environment. While demanding transparency and disclosure from companies, 
they must follow the same principles. They must cultivate their image and reputation, because 
it affects their legitimacy and, therefore, their survival, individually and as a sector. And they 
must strive to be agents of change not only with respect to social outcomes, but also with 
respect to society’s attitudes and values.
3 
In view of the above, it is understandable that NGOs should have been criticized, across the 
board and in specific cases, for neglect of their original goals, lack of legitimacy, inefficiency, 
lack of transparency, etc. (Zaidi, 1999; Foote, 2001; Gibelman and Gelman, 2001, 2004; 
MacDonald et al., 2002).
4 
For all these reasons, numerous attempts have been made to self-regulate NGOs through codes 
of conduct, codes of ethics, rules of behavior, recommendations, good practices, etc. These 
documents serve a variety of purposes: they define what is accepted or acceptable behavior, 
promote high standards of practice, provide benchmarks for self-assessment, establish 
frameworks for members’ conduct and responsibilities, help avoid problems of collective action 
(when various organizations are affected), etc. 
The next section of this paper explains the role of ethical codes as instruments to control and 
regulate NGOs. The following section discusses the contents of a Spanish standard published in 
2004. The article concludes with some comments on this standard from the point of view of 
accountability.
5 
                                              
2 NGOs pose a challenge to the very concept of economic efficiency, because in those organizations there is not a 
clear distinction between inputs and outputs. “Should a volunteer’s time be treated as an input if the volunteer 
herself is enriched by the experience?”, asks Wells (2006), pp. 7-8). 
3 Other reasons are insufficient government oversight, absence of direct voter or stakeholder regulation, increasing 
media coverage and public scrutiny from scandals in the NGOs sector, shift from government funding toward direct 
funding of nonprofits, the belief among donors that NGOs are more effective than governments in providing basic 
social services, that they are better able to reach the poor, and that they are key players in democratizations 
processes, and the belief of the NGOs members that accountability “is the right thing to do” (Bies, 2001; cfr. also 
Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Light, 2000). 
4 Fowler (1997) pillories NGO “pretenders”, such as the BRINGOs (Briefcase NGOs), CONGOs (Commercial NGOs), 
FANGOs (Fake NGOs), CRINGOs (Criminal NGOs), GONGOs (Government-owned NGOs), MANGOs (Mafia NGOs), 
PANGOs (Party NGOs), etc. 
5 Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006) allude to the absence of studies on the accountability mechanisms within the third 
sector.  
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Accountability is an important issue because of the influence that NGOs have on the life of 
many people, including those that are not the direct object of the NGOs’ promoted policies.
6 
Organizations may be considered responsible solely to themselves or to their owners. 
Alternatively, they can also be accountable to those stakeholders who have the most power to 
influence the organization’s actions, or to society as a whole, especially clients or beneficiaries 
of the NGOs’ operations. Then, there is a variety of alternative accountability meanings, from 
identity accountability (the NGO is answerable to itself and to its members through its values, 
mission and culture), to accountability to the owners (for example, the core activists that 
control the NGO), to those stakeholders who have the ability to influence the results of the 
organization, or to all those stakeholders upon whom the NGO’s actions have or may have an 
impact (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006).     
Codes of Ethics for NGOs 
Lloyd (2005) identifies six reasons for self-regulation in the NGO sector: 1) The rapidly 
increasing number of NGOs and their growing influence has made them key players in society, 
which demands responsibility and accountability. 2) NGOs’ success in changing national and 
international policy has led other agents (governments, companies, unions and public opinion) 
to question their legitimacy. 3) Their rapid growth has outpaced the ability of many 
governments to effectively regulate the areas in which NGOs operate. 4) Even in countries with 
proper regulation, self-regulation is seen as a way of going beyond the legal minimum to 
promote higher standards of governance and accountability. 5) NGOs need to maintain society’s 
trust, and to do that they must meet higher standards in their own organization and operations. 
6) The need to diversify sources of funding and attract other donors makes self-regulation a 
necessity. 
Self-regulation can be achieved in many different ways along a continuum between two 
extremes: codes of conduct, on the one hand, and accreditation and certification systems on the 
other. Codes of conduct are self-regulatory mechanisms where groups of organizations agree on 
standards governing their conduct, with each promising to abide by established norms. 
Accreditation and certification systems are self-regulatory systems involving independent 
external reviews of an organization’s compliance with pre-established standards and norms 
(Shea, 2004).
7  
Codes are voluntary and lack enforcement mechanisms. This makes it more likely that NGOs 
will adopt them, and encourages their members to learn and adapt to the code’s requirements. 
Codes can also be enforced indirectly through awareness of the impact of non-compliance on 
NGO reputation, or by making compliance a condition for access to certain sources of finance.
8 
Certification mechanisms are subject to external control and so are stricter (Leader, 1999), 
although they do not always have means of enforcement. In any case, enforcement mechanisms 
                                              
6 “Accountability is generally defined as the means by which individuals and organizations are answerable to others 
and are held responsible by their actions” (Bies, 2001, p. 52). Cornwall et al. (2000, p. 3) suggest that there is an 
external dimension (about being held responsible by others) and an internal dimension (about taking responsibility 
for oneself). Cfr. Ebrahim (2003).  
7 Bies (2001, pp. 52-53) calls these types of systems “discretionary” and “mandatory self-regulation models.”  
8 For example, the UK Disasters Emergency Committee requires that members be signatories to the Code of Conduct 
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. And the Australian Council for International Development (CFID) limits access to 
Australian government funds to signatories of its Code of Conduct.   
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vary greatly: publication of annual reports, external audits, committee oversight, complaint 
mechanisms, etc., depending on the needs of the sector in each country at any given time.
9 
It is generally recognized that the first code in the field of humanitarian aid was the Code of 
Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster 
Relief (www.icrc.org). It stemmed from the recognition by some international NGOs of the poor 
quality of their work in Sudan in the late 1980s.
10 The first self-regulation initiative, The 
Caucus of Development NGOs (CODE-NGO) Code of Conduct, was ratified in the Philippines in 
1991 (Sidel, 2003), although there are important precedents.
11 In the U.S., InterAction, a 
membership association of private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in 1993 developed a set of 
standards (InterAction, 2006). And a number of European and U.S. NGOs published in 2000 a 
Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (the “Sphere Standards”). 
Since then, the number of codes and similar documents has multiplied.
12  
Some codes, such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent code, or the World Association of Non-
governmental Organizations (Wango) Code of Ethics and Conduct for NGOs, are global in scope. 
Others are for individual countries (Sierra Leone, Philippines, Somalia, Botswana, Ethiopia, 
Zimbabwe, etc.). Still others apply to a particular NGO or group of NGOs acting collectively.  
Some codes are basically statements of principle, like the Red Cross and Red Crescent code, 
BOND’s Statement of Principles
13 or the Caux Principles for NGOs, while others contain detailed 
rules of conduct, such as the Wango code mentioned earlier or, in Spain, the Code of Conduct of 
Development NGOs (www.congde.org). Some codes are aimed exclusively at NGOs, while others 
apply to other stakeholders as well (e.g., those regulating the conduct of NGOs in war zones, 
which are also intended to influence the behavior of the belligerents). 
In content, some codes (e.g., Wango) are intended to offer guidance in all areas of NGO operations, 
while others emphasize certain specific aspects, such as accountability for donations,
14 the battle 
against HIV/AIDs,
15 or personnel management in aid NGOs.
16 Some codes address all NGOs, others 
only particular subgroups, such as development NGOs or philanthropic organizations.
17  
In what follows, we shall be considering a particularly interesting instrument: the experimental 
Spanish standard Ética. Sistema de gestión de las ONG (Ethics. An NGO management system), 
approved by Aenor in 2005. Aenor (Spanish Association for Standardization and Certification) 
is a private, independent, not-for-profit organization committed to the development of 
standardization and certification in all industrial and service sectors. It is recognized nationally, 
                                              
9 See Lloyd (2005) for a list of NGO self-regulation systems and a list of self-regulation initiatives.  
10 Sometimes, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement – The International Committee of the Red 
Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and its member National Societies are 
included in a separate category as Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies (NGHAs).  
11 “In the US non profit context, the history of mandatory self-regulation models begins in 1918 with the creation of 
the National Charities Information Bureau (NCIB)” (Bies, 2001, p. 56).  
12 Naidoo (2004) estimates that self-regulation initiatives exist in 40 countries worldwide.  
13 BOND is a network of over 290 UK-based voluntary organizations (www.bond.org.uk). 
14 Cf. BBB Wise Giving Alliance Standards for Charity Accountability (www.give.org).  
15 An example is the Code of Good Practice for NGOs Responding to HIV/AIDS, promoted by eleven NGOs 
(www.ifrc.org).  
16 People in Aid Code of Good Practice in the Management and Support of Aid Personnel (2003), updated version of 
People in Aid Code of Best Practice (1997) (www.dochas.ie). 
17 For example, the Statement of Values and Code of Ethics for Charitable and Philanthropic Organizations 
(www.independentsector.org), or the ePhilanthropy Code of Ethical Online Philanthropic Practices 
(www.ePhilanthropy.org).  
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at a European level, and internationally. It develops standards and certificates in quality 
management, environmental management, risk prevention auditing, etc. 
The Spanish Standard for Ethical NGO Management  
In 2000, Aenor decided to prepare, with the help of a working group of experts and NGOs 
representatives, a set of standards for the design of ethical, social and environmental 
management systems in companies and other organizations. Out of this work came the standard 
named Ethics. NGO management system, approved in 2004. This is the first standard produced in 
Spain to “define the requirements of an ethical management system in NGOs” (Aenor, 2004, #1).  
Unlike the codes, principles and good practices mentioned previously, the Aenor standard is not 
intended as a tool of industry self-regulation, although people who work in NGOs helped to 
prepare it (alongside academics, unions, consultants, etc., but not employers’ representatives). 
The standard is sponsored by Aenor, which is not attached to any NGOs; its purpose is to 
inform, guide NGO management, certify, and demonstrate conformity or nonconformity. It is 
therefore a mechanism of external control, not by the political authorities but by civil society, 
or part of it, which is what makes it particularly interesting.  
It is a voluntary standard, so any NGO that wishes to may submit to the certification process and 
obtain the certificate that proves compliance with the standard. This has obvious advantages for 
an NGO’s reputation, and also for its management (in that it will be aware of its own situation 
and the ethical quality of its actions). It is not merely a declaration of principle, but nor does it 
go into full regulatory detail. Every organization that seeks certification must develop its own 
conception of ethical management, draw up its own documents (code of conduct, etc.), acquire 
commitments, establish mechanisms for continuous assessment of its ethical management, and 
devise its own indicators. Thus, the standard leaves it to each individual NGO to set its own 
goals and methods, but demands a certain minimum ethical content.  
The standard applies to Spain (in fact, the problems of NGOs working in developing countries 
are not considered). And it is experimental and subject to periodic revision, as is to be expected 
in a new and changing field, where experience in applying the standard is an important input 
to the improvement process. Annex 1 shows the index of the Aenor standard. 
In what follows we shall briefly discuss the most noteworthy aspects of the Ethics. NGO 
management system standard, comparing it with other codes and with the literature on ethical 
problems in NGO management. We will not be dealing with the more technical and 
organizational aspects discussed in the sections of the standard designed to offer guidance to 
NGOs on the development and implementation of an ethical management system.
18 Our interest 
is in the discussion of the accountability issues of NGOs. 
                                              
18 The standard suggests, for example, that compliant NGOs must establish, document, implement and maintain an 
ethical management system (#4.1.a and 5.1), draw up an ethics code (#4.1.b), create an ethical management 
committee (#5.3), develop indicators for their ethical management system (#5.4), identify stakeholders and their 
representatives (#4.1.c), provide them with the necessary information (#4.1.g), regularly renew their governing bodies 
(#4.1.j), run audits of the ethical management system (#5.5), and create a continuous improvement system (#5.6). 
Lastly, almost all the sections include a requirement to document actions and incidents. Many of these points are 
found in other codes, where they tend to be treated in more detail (e.g. Wango, 2004). On ethical, social and 
environmental management systems, see Argandoña (2004).    
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The standard does not give an explicit definition of NGOs. Instead, it describes them as “not-
for-profit organizations governed by private law and with independent legal status, pursuing 
programs of general interest for the improvement of society in the fields of social welfare and 
sustainability: community action, education, healthcare, environmental protection, development 
cooperation and sustainable development” (#1).
19  
There are some ambiguities in this definition. For example, no distinction is made between 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVO), and not-for-
profit organizations (NPO).
20 The distinction between these types of organizations may be legal, 
economic, financial (source of funding), functional (functions performed) or structural-
operational (Vakil, 1997).
21  
However, any attempt at clarification runs into difficulties. For example, if we emphasize 
the voluntary nature of NGOs’ work, we ignore the trend toward professionalization, driven 
by the need to accomplish their mission satisfactorily.
22 An important part of the definition is 
the private, non-governmental nature of NGOs (although the increasing tendency for 
governments to use NGOs to channel state aid puts a question mark over this distinction),
23 
their non-profit-seeking nature, their stability
24 and management autonomy, the fact that they 
are formally constituted (which excludes some informal NGOs, typical of developing countries), 
and their non-violent methods (Martens, 2002).
25 The idea of NGOs as an active and 
representative part of civil society is attractive, but highly debatable (Abramson, 1999).
26 
In any case, it seems only natural that the Spanish standard should not address these (and 
other) debates over terminology or the definition of what an NGO is or is not,
27 as its purpose is 
to offer guidance on the ethical management systems of institutions which, in any case, act on 
various criteria from companies (which are subject to different standards), just as most codes do 
not go into precise definitions. And yet, the list of activities “of general interest for the 
improvement of society in the fields of social welfare and sustainability” used to define the 
purpose of the standard seems very incomplete. It could be expanded to include, for instance, 
welfare, development, advocacy, education, networking and research, to offer a broader 
perspective. The standard makes no reference to the level at which NGOs operate (international, 
                                              
19 Quotations from the standard are given with the paragraph number.  
20 “Not-for-profit” seems preferable to “non-profit”, in the sense that an NGO does not aim to make a profit, but may 
do so on occasion – although profit is never distributed among the owners or members.   
21 Ruiz (2000), in an overview of the nonprofit sector in Spain, includes associations, foundations, cooperatives, 
mutual provident societies, schools, sports clubs, savings banks with social welfare activities, and hospitals. 
Obviously, not all these can be described as NGOs.  
22 NGOs are voluntary in another sense, too: they are set up by private initiative and voluntary commitment, rather 
than in response to a legal requirement (Wango, 2004, II.E.1).  
23 This is apparent in the case of GONGOs (government-organized organizations), created by developing country 
governments to capture aid funds from developed countries; and, in the advanced countries, QUANGOs (quasi-
nongovernmental organizations), financed almost exclusively from public funds. Also, DONGOs (donor-organized 
organizations), created by donors to channel their donations, lack independent management (Vakil, 1997).  
24 Cf. Coordinadora de ONG para el desarrollo (1998).  
25 Their strong grass-roots support and hence their ability to identify the problems of their constituents and then 
tailor assistance to meet their needs (Nalinakumari and MacLean, 2005) is not a defining trait, but a consequence of 
their success.  
26 For a point of view favorable to the identification of NGOs with civil society, See Edwards (2000). The Caux 
Principles for NGOs make service the fundamental principle, defining service in terms of the function that each NGO 
voluntarily assumes in civil society. This fundamental principle is the basis for the other, “derivative” principles: 
independence, representation, participation, respect for the law, care, integrity and accountability.  
27 The standard defines the third sector as a “set of legally constituted, aid-oriented not-for-profit organizations 
governed by private law and with independent legal status” (#2).   
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regional, national or community-based), although the nature of the problems are likely to be 
very different in each case. 
The Principles 
The standard’s point of departure is the fact that every NGO has certain values, ethical and 
social principles that define its mission and activities. As in ethics codes, the list of principles 
given in the standard is merely indicative and declarative: the intention is not that these and 
only these principles are relevant, but that NGOs must have “their own values and principles,” 
which ideally should be “aligned or complementary to those listed here” (#3.1). In any case, it 
appears that the principles are intended to serve as an ethical guide for the organization, its 
policies and its actions, and as rules for interpreting subsequent recommendations.  
The standard briefly outlines the principles in three blocks, basically corresponding to the three 
main NGO stakeholder groups (though the term “stakeholder” is not used). Definitions of the 
principles are not provided.  
The principles relating to the individual are: (recognition of) human dignity, defense of the 
rights of the individual (which it is assumed are synonymous with human rights),
28 and 
solidarity. The principles relating to society are: trust (NGOs must generate trust), openness 
(they must have a positive influence on the social environment and be receptive to society’s 
demands), and cooperation (with other agents). The internal principles, aimed at the 
organization itself, are: legality, transparency, management effectiveness and efficiency, 
professionalism, continuous improvement, participation, and decentralization and demarcation 
of decision making.  
Merely listing these principles does not seem particularly illuminating. Compared to the lists of 
principles given in other codes, little effort appears to have been made to specify all 
the principles that are really important for this standard. Or at least, the distinction between 
these principles and the requirements discussed later is unclear, as the requirements 
(transparency and accountability, for example) obviously must be based on the principles. The 
principles of professionalism and continuous improvement overlap, as professionalism is 
defined in terms of “constantly improving the ethical and technical knowledge, know-how and 
judgment of paid and voluntary staff” (#3.4), while continuous improvement is defined as 
“setting goals and identifying opportunities to improve the organization” (#3.4). All the same, 
we must not forget that the standard is aimed at the implementation of a management system 
in NGOs, which entails an emphasis on continuous improvement both in individuals and in the 
organization.  
The principle of cooperation (“to include networking with other social and political 
organizations among their purposes and plans,” #3.3) does not necessarily apply to all NGOs,
29 
just as the separation of decision-making among governing and management bodies probably 
makes little sense in small NGOs. However, if the standard is part of an effort to improve NGOs’ 
technical and economic organization, this principle seems valid, though it is unlikely to be as 
important as others.   
                                              
28 This principle would have been clearer if it had been linked to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and if 
some of the fundamental rights had been made explicit, as in Wango (2004), I.C and D.  
29 A similar principle appears in other codes; for example, Wango (2004), I.A.   
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Recommendations Given in the Standard 
The standard uses the stakeholder scheme to organize its recommendations, as shown in Table 1. 
It does not include a section on internal aspects of NGO management (integrity, structure and 
responsibilities of governing bodies, political independence, financial management, etc.).    
Owner-Shareholders: Members, Cooperative Members, Sponsors, Executive Committee  
In this section, the standard (#4.2) borrows the terminology and analysis of corporate social 
responsibility and business ethics, as exemplified by the use of the term “owner-shareholders”, 
which is inappropriate. In any case, the generic term “members” refers to “individuals or 
corporations that exercise sovereignty over the organization” (#2). In a company this would be 
the owners, the shareholders, or their representatives; in an NGO, it would include the members 
(in associations), cooperative members (in cooperatives), patrons or sponsors (in foundations), 
and members of the executive committees. The duties of an NGO, which are rights of the 
members, are described as follows:
30 
1)  Duties inherent in membership: equal rights and duties, fair treatment, right to be heard 
and to voice complaints,
31 non-discrimination, participation, equal opportunity, 
transparency in electoral processes, etc. 
2)  Disclosure duties: about members’ rights and duties, the organization’s mission and 
values, its actions and financial performance, etc. In the case of sponsors and managers, 
the standard emphasizes the right to information for decision making, and the need for 
“channels and indicators to directly ascertain the degree of satisfaction and fulfillment 
of the rights of all interested parties” (#4.2.2.c). 
3)  Training duties, in the case of sponsors and managers.  
Contributors of Funds 
Many of the ethical problems in NGO management have to do with fundraising, which is even 
more important for NGOs than it is for companies. This is due to the fact that raising and 
channeling funds is often their primary mission, and also because the continuing trust of the 
contributors of funds is crucial to NGO survival.
32 
First, the standard establishes, that “the organization must seek funds in accordance with its 
mission” (#4.3.1), which implies that establishing the NGO’s mission and goals is a precondition 
                                              
30 For an analysis of some of the ethical problems presented here, see Lehr-Lehnardt (2005) and Gibelman and 
Gelman (2004).  
31 This right seems to refer to members’ status as customers, as in the case of members of a cooperative, rather than 
as members per se (#4.2.1.c).  
32 On the ethical problems of fundraising in NGOs, see Zaidi (1999), Fisher (1997), Vernis (2001), Lehr-Lehnardt 
(2005), Brown and Kalegaonkar (2002), Gibelman and Gelman (2004).  
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for fund raising.
33 And secondly, that it “must manage them effectively and efficiently for the 
purpose for which they were given” (#4.3.1).
34  
Among contributors of funds, the standard (#2) includes donors (“individuals or companies that 
make contributions in cash or in kind to the organization for the pursuit of its activity for nil 
consideration”), sponsors (“those who contribute financial or material resources to an 
organization or one of its projects in order that the organization’s values or attributes be 
associated with the sponsor’s image”), and subsidizers (governments, insofar as they contribute 
funds to NGOs).  
1) To attract donations, an NGO must demonstrate its achievements (Zaidi, 1999), which may 
tempt its managers to exaggerate the success of their previous initiatives and the benefits 
obtained. NGOs have a fiduciary obligation towards their donors that may sometimes be legally 
enforceable. That is why an NGO’s first duty to its contributors of funds is disclosure and 
accountability.
35 The standard includes a general duty to disclose information on the 
organization’s mission, values, governing bodies, programs, etc., not as part of the general duty 
of d isc lo sure t o so ciet y, but s pec if ically t o t he co ntributors o f f und s, so a s to in form t heir  
decision making (including information about negative aspects of the NGO’s management: 
complaints, claims, inspections, legal disputes and audit results). It also states a duty to inform 
about the use of funds, not only at the end of the project, but also during the project, and to 
report on compliance with this standard (#4.3.5).  
2) With respect to donors (#4.3.2), the duty of disclosure and accountability includes disclosure 
of the ratio of fundraising costs and overhead costs, on the one hand, to revenues, on 
the other;
36 breach of commitments regarding the use of funds for projects (this is related to the 
principles of effectiveness and efficiency); and the duty to document the follow-up reports on 
the use of funds (which is natural if the aim is to develop a management system). Further 
on (#4.3.5.a), the standard includes what we consider the very important principle of donors’ 
limited liability, stating that donors must not be held “directly liable for specific problems and 
their solutions.”  
3) The standard pays particular attention to relations with sponsors, as they tend towards 
actions that distort an NGO’s values and goals. It demands that sponsors respect “the NGO’s 
independence of action” (#4.3.3.e), in reference to the so-called sponsor-client problem (Zaidi, 
1999). Hence the duty to make “full and transparent disclosure” (#4.3.3.a) of the sponsorship 
process, probably because of possible conflicts of interest or deviation from the organization’s 
                                              
33 This is an fundamental ethical rule that is not always respected. The Economist (2000, p. 25) reported the 
following exchange: “A young man thrusts his crudely printed calling card at the visitor. After his name are printed 
three letters: NGO. ‘What do you do?’ the visitor asks. ‘I have formed an NGO.’ ‘Yes, but what does it do?’ ‘Whatever 
they want. I am waiting for some funds and then I will make a project.’”  
34 NGOs must behave efficiently in two senses: decisions inside the organization must be taken in a rational way, 
and NGOs must show efficiency to the providers of funds. But both types of efficiencies do not provide the 
touchstone for NGOs’ accountability (Wells, 2006).  
35 Unlike the owners of a company, who are entitled to the residual profit and control of the business, the 
contributors of funds have no right to supervise the NGO’s management. What is established here is a right to 
monitor the use of the resources donated (Glaeser, 2002).  
36 The purpose of this is, among other things, to avoid careless management or management for the benefit of the 
NGO’s staff, rather than its clients; excessive spending on marketing to attract donations; or generally putting 
fundraising before the NGO’s goals.   
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goals;
37 the duty to establish “criteria and requirements for acceptance or rejection of potential 
sponsors, so as to foster consistency between sponsors’ activities and the NGO’s mission and 
values” (#4.3.3.b); and the need for a collaboration agreement that prohibits behaviors that may 
compromise the NGO’s mission and values (#4.3.3.c). The standard also recommends that 
sponsorship relationships be long term (#4.3.3.d).  
4) With regard to subsidizers (governments), the standard first establishes a duty of consistency, 
so that the mere availability of government funds does not justify the acceptance of projects 
that are incompatible in content, scale or resource requirements with the NGO’s mission and 
management capabilities (#4.3.4.b), as this would compromise its effectiveness and efficiency, 
and even its legitimacy (Vernis 2001; Fisher 1997).
38 Secondly, it establishes a duty 
of disclosure (#4.3.4.c), which it defines more precisely and in more detail than the duty of 
disclosure to donors and sponsors.  
The standard sees the relationship between contributors of funds and NGOs as one of supply 
and demand. The initiative may come from NGOs, which appeal for donations, or from 
contributors, who offer funds for specific projects. The standard then establishes the conditions 
for an ethically and technically correct and satisfactory relationship, supported by NGO 
accountability to donors. It does not consider the possibility of donors taking a more active 
role, catalyzing, encouraging and supporting the NGOs’ work, assisting NGO self-regulation and 
making the public regulatory framework more effective, promoting government collaboration 
with NGOs, etc., as other initiatives have suggested.
39   
Volunteers and Paid Staff 
Due to the very nature of NGO operations, human resources managemen t in NGOs is ver y  
important. The standard deals with this issue at some length, although many of its 
recommendations apply to all kinds of organizations, not just NGOs (#4.4.1)
40: appropriate 
working conditions, a healthy and safe work environment, employees’ right to express their 
own ideas and opinions (always within the framework of the organization’s principles and 
values) (#4.4.1.c), proper treatment of employees, staff motivation without exploitation (which 
is particularly important in this type of organization), information (especially about the projects 
being carried out), and participation.  
In the case of paid staff (#4.4.2), further recommendations include protection of employees’ 
right to privacy, non-discrimination, hiring of people with disabilities, care to ensure that 
employees behave ethically in their daily tasks, an appropriate pay policy, transparent, free and 
competitive hiring, employee training, appropriate promotion criteria, disciplinary action and 
dismissal, and employee autonomy. Clearly, all these duties are not specific to NGOs, nor, 
within NGOs, do they apply only to paid staff, but also to voluntary workers.
41 Only one section 
                                              
37 The standard does not deal specifically with NGO conflicts of interest, although they can be serious: an example is 
the conflict that arises when a member of management has a personal interest in the decision on which project to 
finance. Cf. MacDonald et al. (2002). Other codes address this issue explicitly in various dimensions; for example, 
Wango (2004) deals with conflicts of interest within NGO governing bodies (IV.E) and among NGO staff (V.B).  
38 On the problem of NGO legitimacy, see Edwards and Hulme (1996).  
39 For example, USAID (1995), InterAction (2006).  
40 On this type of problems in NGOs, see Foote (2001).  
41 The duty to guarantee privacy and confidentiality of information, however, applies to all the people or institutions 
with which an NGO has dealings (#4.1.f).   
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is specific to paid staff and NGOs: “trial periods may not take the form of voluntary work” 
(#4.4.2.j).  
Voluntary workers play a particularly important role in many NGOs, to which the standard 
pays special attention (#4.4.3). It starts by saying that “the participation of volunteers in an 
NGO’s activity must be based on criteria of social participation” (#4.4.3.a). Some of the duties 
mentioned are an attempt to specify rules for volunteers that will generally apply to all staff, 
but are particularly important for volunteers, on account of their motivation and the fact that 
they cost NGOs almost nothing, which could lead some NGOs to take their efforts and 
achievements for granted. They include: an orientation process for new volunteers; volunteer 
job descriptions; volunteer recruitment based on criteria of effectiveness and efficiency; 
provision of sufficient training (to avoid amateurism) and material means; private health, 
accident and liability insurance in accordance with the risks of the job; reimbursement of 
expenses incurred in volunteering; clear differentiation between paid jobs and volunteer jobs; 
limited duration of volunteer commitments, etc.   
Clients  
The standard defines NGO’s clients as the “recipients of the organization’s goals and activities” 
(#2). Obviously, the ethical problems that may arise in relations with clients are very important, 
as they directly affect the core of an NGO’s mission and activities, and because the clients often 
are in a state of need.
42 The standard takes it for granted that the NGO’s mission and goals must 
be clearly defined, and specifies the organization’s duties toward its clients as follows (#4.5): 
1)  Disclosure about the ethical values and principles on which the ONG operates, the 
nature of the services it offers, and the client’s contributions, rights and duties. 
Although many of the NGOs in Spain operate in other countries, the standard makes no 
reference to a problem common to NGOs working in other cultures: the sometimes 
unwitting propagation of Western values, especially in NGOs engaged in humanitarian 
aid, promoting the rights of women, children or minorities, as defined by Western 
society (The Economist, 2000).  
2)  Respect for clients, avoiding “arrogant, paternalistic or hierarchical attitudes” (#4.5.b), 
promoting client participation, safeguarding the confidentiality of client data and 
privacy, etc. Paternalism is a frequent problem in NGOs, especially when working with 
marginal groups without resources or expertise, or when the NGO staff are deeply 
convinced of their ideas or have great respect and admiration for their founder (Brown 
and Kalegaonkar, 2002). Elitism can be a problem (Lehr-Lehnardt, 2005) when the staff 
are highly professional and become detached from the everyday lives and concerns of 
their clients. It is therefore crucial to establish channels of communication between 
NGO staff and the disadvantaged society in which they work. The standard does not 
include any prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of race, creed, nationality, 
political beliefs, etc. 
3)  Transparency: NGOs must avoid misleading promotions and not misuse client data to 
enhance their own representative status. 
                                              
42 On this type of problem, see Lehr-Lehnardt (2005), Brown and Kalegaonkar (2002), The Economist (2000).  
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4)  Accountability: the standard recommends that NGOs create mechanisms for assessing 
their own performance, establish procedures for processing complaints, suggestions and 
claims, and periodically measure client satisfaction, etc. 
5)  Effectiveness and efficiency: the duty to provide the promised level of services, or at 
least the level that is customary and legitimate. 
6)  Rejection of “payments, gifts or other practices that may constrain the freedom or 
influence the behavior of either party” (#4.5.h). This requirement is aimed against a 
form of corruption (in client-NGO relations), although the term “corruption” is not 
explicitly used.   
Suppliers and Subcontractors 
The rules on relations with suppliers and subcontractors (and other providers, though not 
explicitly mentioned) are no different from those included in codes or standards for companies. 
The guiding principle is to “maintain the maximum level of internal consistency between the 
mission and overall objectives [of the NGO] and those of its subcontractors and suppliers” 
(#4.6), just as a socially responsible company must endeavor to ensure that the goals and 
objectives of the participants in its value chain are compatible with its own.  
The standard (#4.6) formulates requirements for the selection and engagement of suppliers and 
subcontractors; the duty to inform suppliers and subcontractors about the ethical management 
system, policies, principles and anything that may be relevant to the contractual relationship; 
and the duty to take corrective measures if the conduct of suppliers or subcontractors does not 
comply with the desired ethical standards. 
It also imposes an obligation to “take appropriate measures to guarantee that there are no 
payments, favors, gifts or other practices that might restrict either party’s freedom to act in 
accordance with its legitimate interests or that might undermine the organization’s principles” 
(#4.6.e). The standard does not explicitly use the terms that define this type of problem 
(corruption, extortion, bribery, conflict of interests, etc.), but obviously this is what it is 
referring to in this section (as in #4.5.h on relations with customers).
43  
Competing Organizations 
Under the heading of competing organizations (#4.7), the standard includes relations of 
competition/rivalry or collaboration with other NGOs, public sector entities (but not 
government bodies, which are dealt with in a later section), and private sector organizations. 
Inter-governmental organizations (IGO) such as United Nations agencies or European Union 
bodies are not included.   
The general rule in relations between NGOs is that competition between services should be 
limited: “an NGO may only offer services and perform tasks that satisfy otherwise unmet real 
needs, or that complement or improve on inadequate resources or systems” (#4.7.1). The 
                                              
43 Gibelman and Gelman (2004) have investigated the different types of wrongdoing by NGO managers worldwide, 
which include the cases mentioned here: creation of shadow companies, theft, resource mismanagement, support for 
activities and groups unrelated to the organization’s interests, money laundering, misappropriation, embezzlement, 
forgery, unjustified pay awards, robbery, links with terrorism, disappearance of donations, misapplication of funds, 
etc.  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 13 
standard therefore excludes destructive competition and favors complementary action, though 
fair, direct competition is permissible when an NGO considers that it can perform a particular 
role better than another, or when the volume or variety of needs justifies the presence of 
several NGOs.  
The standard considers competition with other NGOs (#4.2.7.a) for funds or projects acceptable 
(though it does not say it is desirable). It encourages NGOs to create their own competitive 
advantages, but always acting fairly, relying on their own positive qualities and avoiding 
unjustified criticism and derogatory remarks about competitors; competition must be fair, based 
on truthful disclosure about the organization’s scale, activities and representation.  
The standard encourages NGOs to cooperate with other NGOs (#4.7.2.b) through networking,
44 
exchange of knowledge and experience, respect and equality in mutual relations, and consensus 
in action.
45 The standard does not give any specific recommendations for developing and 
maintaining alliances between organizations.  
Competition/rivalry with the private and public sectors (the latter understood as a service 
provider competing with NGOs) is scarcely touched upon (#4.7.3.a). Unfair competition is 
prohibited, but only in a very limited sense: “engaging in activities or providing services for 
profit, or contrary to the organization’s mission and values” (#4.7.3.a). In other words, the 
standard does not consider the case of NGOs competing with companies or other private 
institutions by, for example, selling products or services below cost, thanks to their donor 
financing.
46 The standard accepts that criticism and public holding to account of the private 
sector are the natural domain of NGOs, but demands that criticism be exercised responsibly and 
that accusations be well founded. 
Lastly, the standard encourages NGOs to work with companies and other institutions to 
“analyze problems, set goals and carry out projects, and also to obtain resources.” It also 
recommends that they “develop models of cooperation and collaboration” (#4.7.3.b). The 
treatment of relations between NGOs and companies is thus very unambitious. The possible 
forms of collaboration are omitted, with the result that there is no discussion of the associated 
ethical problems (Millar et al., 2004).
47 The standard is silent about relations with unions.
48  
Government 
The standard distinguishes three functions of government in relation to NGOs: as regulator 
(overseeing NGO operations, the social services they offer, international cooperation, etc.); as 
planner, coordinator and administrator of NGO resources and activities; and as financier of 
their activities or projects (which was dealt with earlier, in the section on relations with the 
contributors of funds) (#4.8.1). It is worth noting that the standard does not appear to be 
                                              
44 The networking recommendation appears in various places in the standard, probably to draw attention to the 
problem of the fragmentation of NGO activities. Goodin (2003, p. 23) also emphasizes the role of networking as the 
way the Third Sector operates, its way of forcing accountability on other actors, and a mechanism by which non-
profits are themselves held accountable.  
45 On the forms and problems of alliances between NGOs, see Ritchie (1995).  
46 This problem often arises, for example, in fair trade NGOs, which operate on the boundary between not-for-profit 
and for-profit enterprises (Lewis, 1998). 
47 Goodin (2003) criticizes the recommendations for cooperation and competition of NGOs with governments and 
companies, arguing that the Third Sector is motivationally and organizationally different of the other two.  
48 On this subject, see Egels-Zandén and Hyllman (2006).   
14 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
written from an independent viewpoint, but rather seeks to protect NGOs against government 
interference and to actively support them by “bringing government opinion and action into line 
with the real needs” (#4.8.3.e).  
In their relations with regulatory bodies (#4.8.2), NGOs are encouraged to show genuine 
cooperation and avoid taking unfair advantage of situations for their own benefit. The standard 
does not demand that NGOs obey the law, which is included in the principle of legality, but 
encourages them to voice their opinion and judgment on existing or proposed regulations, and 
to publicly denounce “any injustice they may detect, whether perpetrated by government or 
third parties” (#4.8.2.b). It also mentions the duty to inform the regulator, as the monitoring 
body.  
Relations between NGOs and government, as the coordinator of their activities, are to be based 
on independence “on the basis of non-subordination to government” (#4.8.3.a), active 
commitment, resource optimization, participation in joint forums, support, and 
joint  commitments. The standard also points out that NGOs “must promote and participate in 
raising government awareness of issues they know and have found to be important, bringing 
government opinion and action into line with the real needs” (#4.8.3.e), as has already been 
said.   
Society 
Society is an important stakeholder of NGOs, which aim to solve large-scale problems that 
governments may not be able to tackle; which often present themselves to governments, 
companies and other stakeholders as representatives of society; and which must accept their 
social responsibility, just like other agents involved.  
The standard (#4.9) is fairly succinct in its treatment of relations between NGOs and society. It 
seems rather to lobby in NGOs’ favor. It presents them “to society at large as a driving force for 
social change to build a better society” (#4.9.a); and it calls on them to help “create an image of 
professionalism, responsibility and commitment in the NGO sector” (#4.9.c) and to “make 
society aware of their real capacity to get things done” (#4.9.d).  
Specific duties of NGOs to society mentioned in the standard are: to promote citizen 
participation; “not to use the image of their target group [their clients] to put pressure on 
citizens or make them feel guilty” (#4.9.e); to respect the individuality of the members of each 
group and avoid stereotypes; to be truthful in their advertising campaigns; to use these 
campaigns and their own image to support and defend their clients; and to avoid overly 
pessimistic, idealized, overgeneralized or discriminatory messages.  
An important omission in this section is the duty of disclosure and accountability to society 
(the section on “communication – information” (#4.3.5) refers only to donors). This omission 
does not agree with the public function of NGOs, their role as representatives of civil society, or 
the requirements established in codes and rules for companies. And it seems unlikely to help 
build trust in NGOs or strengthen their legitimacy (Lehr-Lehnardt 2005).  
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Conclusions: The Accountability of NGOs 
In the preceding pages, we have made abundant comments on the strengths and weaknesses of 
the standard. Here, we shall merely make some general observations with emphasis on the 
issues related to the accountability of NGOs. 
1) The standard is based on a limited, very pragmatic concept of disclosure. Disclosure appears 
to be confined to donors, employees and volunteers (and even then, to a very limited extent); 
and also to the regulator. Duties of disclosure to important stakeholders, such as society and 
clients (the beneficiaries of NGOs’ actions), are omitted.  
2) A limited concept of disclosure entails also a limited concept of accountability (Lloyd, 2005) 
and, therefore, a possible “accountability gap” (Salamon et al., 2000). The standard does not 
devote sufficient attention to the principle that NGOs must render account of their activities to 
all their stakeholders. Rather, again taking a pragmatic approach, it seems to concentrate on 
donors and the authorities, besides members. It demonstrates excessive accountability 
“upwards” and too little accountability “downwards”, which is NGOs’ “Achilles heel” (Smillie, 
1995). A broader concept of accountability would offer greater scope for reflection and self-
criticism, yet this does not appear to be the purpose of the standard, which, as we pointed out 
earlier, seems in some respects designed to bolster the power of the NGO sector, that is, the 
existing of large NGOs (which are the ones that were most directly involved in drafting the 
standard). This also suggests the need for further thought as well as theoretical and practical 
development of NGO accountability (Najam, 1996). 
3) The standard leaves much to be desired in regard to dialogue between stakeholder and client, 
participation and involvement in planning NGO projects, and at the different stages of 
implementation, monitoring and reporting.
49 The demands commonly placed on companies in 
writings on social responsibility should be all applicable to not-for-profit social institutions, 
where some of the usual objections to stakeholder participation are less convincing.  
4) In the stakeholder approach, an NGO must be accountable to a wide range of stakeholders; 
but this is not easy, since NGO’s responsibilities are naturally varied, complex and diffuse 
(McDonald 1999), and also because the means of enforcing the standard are very weak. In any 
case, the standard pays no attention to the need to balance the demands of all these 
stakeholders against each other; nor does it suggest how this might be done.
50 
5) The most important stakeholders for NGO accountability must be the clients themselves. 
Therefore, an NGO must “have some level of formal or semi-formal accountability to those it 
wishes to see empowered – its constituents” (Kilby, 2006; cf. Smith-Sreen, 1995). In any case, 
this accountability to clients is ethical and social; therefore, it falls within the scope of social 
responsibility (Argandoña, 2006) and so must be the result of an internal attitude and, where 
appropriate, a commitment to an industry code or standard such as the one we are considering 
                                              
49 Ebrahim (2003) distinguishes between four levels of participation by societies and communities in the NGOs’ 
projects: information and consultation about projects, public involvement in project-related activities, negotiation, 
bargaining and even, veto power on decisions, and people’s own initiatives.   
50 Accountability means that the organization must, first, identify its stakeholders and stakeholder groups, second, to 
prioritize the stakeholders and to be explicit about that prioritization, and third, define the relationships between the 
organization and each stakeholder group, as expressed through the intentions and views of the organization, the 
current laws, rules and quasi-legal regulations, and the views of the stakeholders themselves (Gray et al., 2006).   
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here. Furthermore, accountability to clients is not independent of accountability to other 
stakeholders,
51 as the two may conflict. 
6) The broad meaning of accountability that we propose asks for the involvement of NGOs’ 
leaders with accountability policy and practices, integrating accountability into strategic 
planning, employing internally driven forms of self-regulation and integrating learning from 
accountability evaluations into organizational practices (Bies, 2001). And the voluntary aspect 
of the standard is compatible with this point of view, although it is not promoted or encouraged 
by it.  
7) The standard takes sides with NGOs, in that it avoids the necessity of opening a general 
dialogue among NGOs and other stakeholders. The organizations are responsible for engaging 
in an honest and open democratic debate regarding their policies and actions, and this implies 
that the organization must provide an honest and open account of their actions to their 
stakeholders (Unerman and Bennett, 2004).  
8) The standard envisages instruments (codes, reports, audits, etc.) and processes for 
accountability (evaluations, consultations, complaint mechanisms, etc.) (Ebrahim, 2003). But, as 
Mulgan points out (2003), the crucial thing is, to what extent these instruments and processes 
lead to a change of behavior.  
9) In the standard, accountability is understood as a disciplinary mechanism, not as a driver for 
change (Young, 2000), ensuring continuous improvement of processes and decisions; as rule-
bound responses of organizations that become important when things go wrong, more than a 
process that is understood as part of the daily organizations life of the NGO (Fry, 1995). 
Although continuous improvement is emphasized, it is limited to traditional mechanisms, in 
which stakeholder dialogue (above all with external stakeholders, especially clients and society) 
plays only a minor role.  
10) The standard is very focused on the environment of Spanish NGOs and pays no attention to 
the problems resulting from their activities in developing countries.  
11) The standard seems to be particularly focused on the development of ethical management 
systems in NGOs, perhaps assuming that this will be sufficient to foster fully ethical behavior in 
organizations and satisfy the demands for compliance disclosure. While it cannot be expected 
to set forth the requirements of an ethical management system in detail, not doing so may limit 
the scope of the ethical management system to mere compliance with a set of administrative 
requirements.  
12) The standard’s authors have apparently tried to broaden its content, making it more of a 
general-purpose code. This is a valid option, and a very appropriate one, because NGOs should 
be organized and managed according to their particular view of the common good, as they 
have a right to address human needs in whatever way they see fit. They must explain their 
visions, missions and policies, and be accountable for them. What NGOs need is not regulation, 
but oversight, insofar as no real harm is done.  
 
 
                                              
51 Tandon (1995) identifies other accountabilities of NGOs: to their mission and values, to their mission fulfillment, 
and to civil society, in which they are actors.   
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